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Abstract
The structure and behavior of the U.S. surface freight transportation industries are undergoing dramatic
change as a result of the decrease in federal government economic regulation of these industries. In particular,
legislative and administrative changes in the approach to regulating intramodal and intermodal mergers have
helped facilitate a restructuring of the U.S. rail system and the establishment of railroad-owned multimodal
transportation firms. Additionally, the exemption of trucking mergers from Interstate Commerce
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result of the constraints placed on it under the conditions where it is actually 
proposed (strong economies of scope over a large network): 
... (T]he only economically justifiable procedure is either to segregate 
out all users who do not use only the facilities in question, or to widen 
the group of movements under consideration further to include all 
those that utilize the other common facilities. This process may have 
to be continued until the group encompasses all movements that are 
confined to a separable portion of the rail network. In some cases, 
such a group may turn out to be sufficiently large so as to render the test 
impractical. [emphasis added] (51). 
(51) W.J. Baumel and R.D. Willig, "Pricing Issues", p. 43. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
MICHAEL R. CRUM 
BENJAMIN]. ALLEN 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
The structure and behavior of the U.S. surface freight transportation 
industries are undergoing dramatic change as a result of the decrease in federal 
government economic regulation of these industries. In particular, legislative 
and administrative changes in the approach to regulating intramodal and inter-
modal mergers have helped facilitate a restructuring of the U.S. rail system 
and the establishment of railroad-owned multimodal transportation firms. 
Additionally, the exemption of trucking mergers from Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) regulation may lead to larger combinations in that industry. 
The current policies and standards governing mergers in the surface freight 
transportation industries differ markedly from those previously in effect. One 
purpose of this paper is to bring the reader up to date by reviewing the current 
merger regulation policies and standards and their evolution. The second pur-
pose of the paper is to provide a brief discussion of the merger guidelines 
employed by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the agency charged with 
enforcing the federal antitrust laws, and their relevancy to and likely impact 
upon transportation mergers. Toward these ends the remainder of the paper 
is divided into three sections: the following section deals with the regulation of 
rail and trucking mergers; section III addresses the regulation of rail-barge 
and rail-truck mergers; Section IV discusses the role and influence of the OOJ 
merger guidelines in transportation mergers. 
(*) Final version: August 1985. 
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II. INTRAMODAL MERGERS 
The ICC's regulation of rail and trucking mergers generally necessitates 
an assessment of the public benefits and harms expected of a proposed merger. 
Specifically, the ICC has weighed the projected economic benefits against the 
potential anticompetitive effects. Before embarking upon an analysis of the 
ICC's regulation of intramodal mergers, a discussion of the potential economic 
benefits of such mergers is warranted. Since the economic benefits of rail and 
trucking mergers have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere, they will only be 
summarily treated here (1 ). 
One of the key problems confronting the railroad industry and contributing 
to its financial woes is the existence of a significant amount of excess route 
capacity (2). Rail mergers are viewed as an effective means of reducing excess 
route capacity. "Parallel " mergers (i.e., mergers among railroads serving many 
of the same cities with routes of nearly equal distance) appear to have the 
greatest potential for reducing excess trackage through either the abandonment 
or the downgrading of redundant track. For instance, Gallamore discovered 
that substantial savings in the maintenance of ways and structures, transporta-
tion, and maintenance of equipment expense categories were predicted for the 
parallel mergers (3). Both Conant and the Task Force on Railroad Productivity 
noted that the projected cost savings of past parallel mergers expressed as a 
percentage of total operating expenses more often than not greatly exceeded 
those of nonparallel mergers (4). 
Another advantage presumed to be characteristic primarily of parallel mer· 
gers is the achievement of greater efficiency through improved routing. The 
merged railroad is expected to route traffic over the superior line (e.g., the 
less circuitous line or the line with the superior grade). Evidently, the merged 
railroad would downgrade rather than abandon parallel lines in order to con-
( 1) For more in-depth discussions of the various economic benefits of rail and truck-
ing mergers, the reader is referred to the following: Robert Gallamore, Railroad Mergers: 
Co1t, Competztion and the Future Organization of the American Railroad Industry, Har-
vard University Ph.D. dissertation, 1968, pp. 290-358; James E. Lane, The Public Interest 
in Railroad Consolidation, Indiana University doctoral dissertation, 1963, pp. 252-266; 
Improving Railroad Productivity, Final Report ot the Task Force on Railroad Productivity 
to the National Commission on Productivity and the Council of Economic Advisor8, Wash-
ington, D.C., pp. 234-244; James C. Johnson, Trucking Mergers: A Regulatory Viewpoint, 
Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1973, pp. 58-80. 
(2) Michael Conant, Railroad Mergers and Abandonments, Univer8ity of California 
Press, Berkeley, California, 1964, pp. 1-24 and Theodore E. Keeler, "Railroad Costs, Re-
turns to Scale, and Excess Capacity", The Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1974, 
pp. 201-208. 
(3) R. Gallamore, op. cit., p. 69. 
(4) M. Conant, op. cit., p. 88; and, Improving Railroad Productivity, p. 251. 
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tinue operating the superior segments between various cities, and segments of 
the downgraded track would be maintained at relatively high standards. 
Though parallel mergers appear to hold the greater potential for cost 
savings, they also tend to be the more objectionable type of merger because 
of their anticompetitive nature. Conversely, "end-to-end " mergers (i.e., mer-
gers among railroads that interchange a substantial volume of traffic) are less 
objectionable on competitive grounds, but the forecasted benefits of such 
mergers are also less (5). Elimination of traffic interlining will reduce clerical 
costs and switching costs and could potentially simplify billing, rate-making 
and revenue divisions by bringing the traffic movement under one management. 
The end-to-end mergers appear to offer greater service benefits than parallel 
mergers. They permit more run-through trains (i.e., yards are by-passed), better 
car tracing service, better utilization of rail cars and, thus, a better car supply 
for the shippers, and liability for loss and damage is more easily determined 
since fewer carriers are involved in the freight movement (6). Shippers prefer 
single-carrier to multi-carrier service for these reasons. One study determined 
that, for 1974, ninety-five percent of the traffic in markets served by single-
carrier service was captured by those single-carrier routes, vis-a-vis traffic ten-
dered to multi-carrier routes (7). A corollary of this last fact which has been 
largely ignored in the literature is the effect an end-to-end merger might have 
on competition. If the end-to-end merger creates the only single-carrier service 
for certain markets, the traffic diversion from competing multi-carrier routes 
could reduce traffic on those routes so drastically that those lines are either 
downgraded or abandoned. Conversely, if the end-to-end merger occurs in 
markets already served by single carrier service, the merger would increase 
the competitiveness of those markets. (In the former case, one might expect 
"defensive " mergers among the multi-carrier routes' railroads or trackage 
agreements or other coordinating arrangements which could permit continued 
competition). Generally, however, end-to-end mergers are believed to have less 
of a negative effect on competition. 
Other potential economic benefits often cited for both parallel and end-to-
end mergers include traffic diversification, consolidation of yards and terminal 
facilities, and traffic growth resulting from diversion of traffic from other trans-
port modes and from other railroads (a benefit for the merged railroad but 
not necessarily for the financial well-being of the entire rail system). Traffic 
diversification is beneficial to the extent that it keeps revenue levels fairly 
constant by balancing the peaks and troughs of different commodity flows. 
(5) M. Conant, op. cit., p. 88; Improving Railroad Productivity, p. 251; R. Gallamore, 
op. cit., pp. 65-68. 
(6) It has been alleged that, because of the low per diem charges assessed, it is 
often more advantageous for railroads to hold other carriers' cars rather than investing in 
new cars. Also, since the cars no longer are interlined, the utilization of cars increases, 
which means that at any given time, more cars would be available (assuming a given volume 
of traffic). 
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For an industry such as the railroads with a large magnitude of fixed costs, 
it is imperative that revenues do not decline. In many situations, yards and 
terminal facilities may be consolidated in order to achieve lower per unit costs 
of switching and loading cars. And, finally, given the existence of excess 
route capacity and the large magnitude of fixed costs and joint and common 
variable costs, traffic growth permits the railroads to realize their economies 
of density (i.e., economies of utilization) (8). 
The expected economic benefits of trucking mergers are analogous to 
those of rail mergers in many respects. As will be discussed later, the major 
benefits cited by the ICC in its evaluations of proposed motor carrier mergers 
were service improvements, though operating efficiency gains were also viewed 
as important considerations. However, Corsi and Boisjoly found no significant 
long-run gains in operating efficiency or financial performance in their study 
of 19 motor carrier mergers consummated during 1973 and 1974 (9). They 
concluded that " any significant benefits from merger activities are most likely 
achieved in the short run from the intracity operations of motor carriers through 
reduced pick-up and delivery expenses, terminal costs, and administrative 
overhead "(10). 
The primary incentive for motor carriers to merge prior to regulatory 
reform appeared to be the desire to increase the size of the route structure (11). 
ICC regulation of entry into new markets was very restrictive, particularly so 
for those carriers involved in less-than-truckload (LTL) operations (12). As 
a result, expansion through internal growth was difficult to achieve. Merger 
often proved to be a more acceptable and quicker means to attaining new 
operating authority as it left the number of carriers in the market unchanged. 
Though the removal or easing of regulatory barriers to market entry permits 
internal expansion, merging may still be the preferred approach to market 
penetration since the purchased carrier has the facilities, equipment and shipper 
contacts already in place. 
With this general background in intramodal merger benefits, the next 
section turns to the analysis of ICC regulation of railroad mergers. 
(7) Alain L. Kornhauser, "Elementary Theory of Traffic Diversions: A Tool for 
Analysis of Restructured Railroad Networks", Transportation Research Record, 1979, p. 58. 
(8) T.E. Keeler, op. cit., p. 208. 
(9) Thomas M. Corsi and Russell Boisjoly, "The Long-Run Effects of Merger in the 
Motor Carrier Industry: The Implications of Deregulation", ICC Practitioners' Journal, 
Vol. 49, No. 3, March-April, 1982, pp. 282-289. 
(10) Ibid, p. 286. 
(11} ).C. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 158-159; and Grant M. Davis, John E. Dillard, Jr., 
and William G. Middleton, "Growth and Structural Changes in Class One Motor Carriers: 
An Empirical Analysis", ICC Practitioners' Journal, Vol. 48, No. 5, July-August 1981, 
pp. 552-559. 
(12} Russel P. Boisjoly and Thomas M. Corsi, "An Identification of the Distinguishing 
Characteristics of Acquired Trucking Firms", ICC Practitioners' Journal, Vol. 48, No. 5, 
July-August 1981, pp. 571-572, 
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ICC REGULATION OF RAILROAD MERGERS 
Legislation Prior to 1976 
Although federal economic regulation of the railroad industry began with 
Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, the ICC was not granted complete 
;mr;autnority over railroad mergers and consolidations until 1920 (the ICC was 
:!ioiven the power to reject but not approve mergers by the Clayton Act of 1914). 
response to the deteriorated state of the railroad industry, the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920 included several pro-railroad provisions including the Congres-
sional mandate that the ICC develop a "master plan" for rail unifications. 
The objective of this consolidation plan was the creation of a limited number 
of railroad systems with approximately equal earnings ability and the preserva-
tion of competition among the systems as fully as possible. In December of 
1929 the ICC issued its master plan which proposed nineteen consolidated 
. rail systems ( 13). Only proposed rail mergers consistent with the plan were 
to be approved by the ICC. 
.. ·. As a result of the dearth of merger activity following the master plan, 
< Congress amended Section 5(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act with the pas-
;·;;, sage of the Transportation Act of 1940 ( 14). The rail consolidation plan was 
·t: ,abandoned, and voluntary rail mergers were encouraged. The ICC was to 
·r~ -lpprove mergers which were found to be " consistent with the public interest ". 
:;g_Section 5(2) (c) (recodified as Section 11344(b) (1)) delineated the consider-
;·: .·~nions to be given weight by the ICC in its merger decisions: 
1) The effect of the proposed transaction upon adequate transportation 
service to the public; 
2) The effect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure to 
include, other railroads in the territory involved in the proposed 
transaction; 
3) The total fixed charges resulting from the proposed transaction, and 
4) The interest of the affected carrier employees. 
Additionally, the ICC was authorized to impose conditions upon an 
approved merger in order to eliminate or alleviate those aspects of the merger 
which are not consistent with the public interest. The ICC has made consi-
derable use of his authority over the years as will be discussed. 
. The legislation enacted in 1940 was the last dealing with railroad mergers 
t;._until the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the 
( 13) James C. Johnson and Terry C. Whiteside, " Professor Ripley Revisited: A 
Analysis of Railroad Mergers", ICC Practitioner's Journal, Vol. 42, No. 4, May-
1975, p. 422. 
(14) Ibid, pp. 429-431. 
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4R Act). As the attitude toward railroad merger regulation changed signifi-
cantly with the 4R Act, a brief discussion of the ICC's implementation of the 
statutory guidelines prior to 1976 is necessary for a comparison of pre- and 
post-regulatory reform merger regulation. 
Implementation of the Section 5(2) (c) Merger Guidelines: 1940-1976 
The change from an ICC-prescribed merger plan to total reliance upon 
railroad-initiated mergers created a more favorable merger environment as 
evidenced by the subsequent flurry of merger activity. The ICC approved about 
100 mergers between 1940 and 1960, and approved 40 of the 59 merger 
applications received from 19 56 to 1971 (15). 
A staff study by the ICC's Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics 
in 1962 traced the ICC's interpretations and applications of the Section 5(2) 
(c) merger guidelines in 12 mergers approved between 1948 and 1960. The 
study reported that, typically, the ICC utilized three separate but related cri-
teria to evaluate the adequacy of transport services: the economy of service 
(i.e., cost reductions and impact upon rates), the efficiency of service (i.e., 
improvement in line-haul operations and impact upon quality of service to 
shippers), and the appropriate provisions and best use of transport facilities (16). 
The impact of the merger upon total fixed charges was initially dismissed by 
the study since " the application of this criterion is not usually a major pro-
blem " ( 17). The interest of affected employees was generally protected via 
the imposition of labor protective conditions upon the merged carrier in accor-
dance with the requirements detailed in Section 5(2) (f) (now Section 11347} of 
the Interstate Commerce Act ( 18). 
The effect upon the public interest of the inclusion or omission of other 
railroads proved to be a difficult criterion to implement. The ICC's primary 
concern here was with the merger's impact upon the future ability of other 
railroads to compete. The study noted that the ICC had difficulty determining 
the extent to which diverted traffic would prove injurious to other railroads 
over the long run and how this would affect their service offerings and the 
overall rail competitive picture (19}. 
Though the impact upon competition was not specifically identified as a 
required public interest consideration in the 1940 legislation, each merger case 
(15) Ibid, p. 431. 
( 16) Railroad Consolidations and the Public Interest - A Preliminary Examination, 
Staff Study by Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics, Interstate Commerce Com· 
mission. Washington, D.C., March 1962, pp. 43-45. 
!17) Ibid, p. 47. 
(18) Ibid, pp. 47-50. 
(19) Ibid, pp. 46-47. 
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reviewed in the 1962 study was scrutinized by the ICC on the basis of the 
impacts upon adequate service and intramodal competition. The impact upon 
intermodal competition began to appear in the later cases covered by the study, 
but the ICC had made little attempt to evaluate the overall competitive results 
with respect to intermodal competition (20). A review of 18 ICC rail merger 
decisions between 1948 and 1974 by Johnson and Whiteside confirmed the 
importance of competition as a public interest criterion (21). 
It should be noted at this time that while mergers in most nonregulated 
industries are subject to review and approval by the DOJ and/or the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), railroad mergers approved by the ICC are relieved 
from the operation of the antitrust laws by Section 5( 11) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act (now Section (11341). However, as will be discussed later, the DO J 
provides input on the competitive effects of merger in the ICC merger eva-
luation process, and the ICC has recently begun utilizing the DOJ's merger 
guidelines in its assessment of proposed rail mergers. 
In essence, the ICC attempted to weigh the anticipated public benefits of 
a merger against the anticipated public harms, and frequently imposed condi· 
tions upon the merged railroad to alleviate the expected harmful effects. Traf-
fic protective conditions were often employed in attempts to lessen anticom-
petitive effects. In a 1950 merger decision the ICC established a set of standard 
traffic and routing conditions (i.e., the DT&I Conditions) which were routinely 
applied to all subsequent mergers. The DT&I Conditions required the merged 
carrier to "maintain and keep open all routes and channels of trade via existing 
• junctions and gateways "(22). The net effect of these conditions was to pre· 
vent the rerouting of traffic previously moving over the lines of the merging 
.. ·railroads. The ICC also interpreted the DT&I Conditions as requiring rate 
equalization as the ICC acknowledged in a later ruling: 
A consolidated carrier was generally prohibited from maintaining rates 
on its new single-line routings, resulting from the consolidation, below the rates 
on any competing joint-line routes in which it participated. We feared that if 
a single-line rate was lowered without securing the concurrence of all connect-
ing carriers in lowering the corresponding joint-line rates, the "commercial 
closing" of certain routes or gateways would occur and competition would 
be reduced " ( 23). 
The ICC's attempts to assuage the undesirable impacts of mergers with 
protective conditions allegedly prevented the merged carriers from realizing 
(20) Ibid, p. 47. 
(21) J.C. Johnson and T.C. Whiteside, op. cit., pp. 432-452. 
(22) Ex Parte No. 282 (Sub. No. 5), Rulemaking Concerning Traffic Protective 
in Railroad Consolidation Proceedings, 366 I.C.C. 112, 1982, pp. 112·114. 
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many of the projected benefits of merger (24). The ICC was also criticized for 
its inconsistent application of the statutory public interest considerations and 
its lengthy delays in rendering decisions (25). As a result of these criticisms 
and a rekindled desire of Congress to improve the health of the railroad 
industry, new merger guidelines were issued in 1976. 
Merger Guideline Within the 4R Act of 1976 
The primary objective of the 4R Act was to improve the financial and 
economic performance of the railroad industry by reducing and modifying the 
existing economic regulations. The statutory changes in merger regulation 
were "intended to encourage mergers, consolidations, and joint use of facilities 
that tend to rationalize and improve the Nation's rail system" (26). 
The 4R Act included an alternative procedure, called the Section 5( 3) or 
" expedited " procedure, for merger petitions which was available to rail-
roads until January 1, 1982. Section 5(3) required the ICC to render its 
decision within a specified time frame (31 months) and provided a more exten-
sive set of public interest criteria: 
( 1 ) the needs of rail transportation; 
(2) the effect on rail and intermodal competition; 
( 3) the environmental impact; 
( 4) the cost of facility rehabilitation; 
(5) the rationalization of the system; 
(6) the impact on shippers, consumers, and railroad employees; 
(7) the effect on communities; and 
(8) whether the transaction will improve rail service. 
(24) Two studies of post-merger performances by Robert Gallamore (Railroad Mergers: 
Cost, Competition, and the Future Organization of the American Railroad Industry, Har-
vard University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1968) and the Midwest Rail Service Study (Retrospec-
tive Study of Selected Railroad Merger.r, Ernst & Whinney, September 1979), found that 
merged railroads rarely achieved the projected benefits. One major explanation for these 
disappointing performances involves tbe ICC's protective conditions. 
(25) The interested reader is reterred to the following publication for a more detailed 
discussion of these criticisms: Michael R. Crum, "A Critique of and Recommendations 
for the ICC's Evaluation of Proposed Railroad Mergers", ICC Practitioners' Journal, Vol. 
51, No. 4, May-June 1984, pp. 368-372. 
(26) S. Rep. No. 94-499, 94th Congress, 1st Sess. 2a (1975), Sections 101 (a) (2) 
and (b) (2), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1976, pp. 13, 34. 
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Interestingly, no rail merger petitions were filed under this alternative 
procedure. However, the merger guidelines contained in Section 5(3) were 
feflected in the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 merger provisions and the ICC's 
general statement of merger policy issued in 1982. 
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 
With the expiration of Section 5(3), the criteria outlined in the Transpor-
tation Act of 1940 were once again the only available statutory guidelines. 
These guidelines were amended by Section 228(a) (2) of the Staggers Rail Act 
of ·1980 (Staggers Act) which added a fifth public interest consideration: 
" whether the proposed transaction would have an adverse effect on competi-
tion among rail carriers in the affected region ". The Staggers Act also 
established time limits similar to those of the 4R Act for the ICC's merger 
decision process. 
In addition to the explicit references to merger regulation, the Staggers 
~ct provided a declaration of national rail transportation policy (27) and 
several significant changes in railroad regulation which should be considered 
in rail merger decisions. The key objectives identified in the statement of 
policy include: the relation of ICC regulation and more reliance upon the 
·.~ <:bmpetitive forces of the marketplace, the continuation of competition where 
.. ·it exists and the development of competition wherever possible, and the 
) .. promotion of a financially healthy railroad industry. Both the 4R Act and 
·:~: the Staggers Act are viewed as pro-railroad legislation. 
':. In response to the changes in regulatory policy mandated by Congress in 
·~ .. the Staggers Act, the ICC issued two rulings in 1982 which significantly 
·' ~tered the regulation of rail mergers. 
ltemoval of DT&I Conditions and the ICC's Current Rail Merger Policy 
In recognition of the emphasis in the Staggers Act upon rate flexibility 
and routing freedom, the ICC abolished its DT&I Conditions (28). The ICC 
concluded that the DT&I Conditions are neither consistent with the Staggers 
Act's intent to foster sound rate and service relationships based on the cost of 
~ce and the competitive pressures of the marketplace nor necessary to 
the public's interest in attaining economic efficiency in the railroad 
/ innn~tr-.r (29). However, the ICC did not rule out the imposition of "specific, 
focused traffic protective conditions if they meet the standards set 
(27) Tide I, Section 101 (a) of S. 1946, Staggers Rail Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-448). 
(28) Ex Parte No. 282 (Sub. No. 5). 
(29) Ibid, pp. 121-126. 
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forth in the Merger Policy Statement", (30) and indicated that it would 
exercise its authority to establish through routes and joint rates if anticompeti-
tive abuses occur in the absence of the DT&I Conditions (31). 
Ex Parte No. 282 (Sub-No. 3), Railroad Consolidation Procedures {decided 
February 19, 1982) contains the ICC's general statement of policy for merger 
or control of at least two class I railroads. The primary concerns expressed 
in the merger policy statement are: the effect on the operating efficiency of the 
total rail system, the effect on inter- and intramodal competition, and the 
continuation of essential transportation services by the merging railroads and 
other affected carriers (32). With respect to the competitive impacts of a 
proposed merger the ICC noted: 
... the Commission does not favor consolidations that substantially 
reduce the transport alternatives available to shippers unless there 
are substantial and demonstrable benefits to the transaction that can-
not be achieved in a less anticompetitive fashion. Our analysis of 
the competitive impacts of a consolidation is especially critical in 
light of the congressionally mandated commitment to give railroads 
greater freedom to price without regulatory interference (33). 
Additionally, the merger policy statement addressed the use of protective 
conditions other than traffic conditions. Section 1111.1 (d) and (e) reveal the 
ICC's reluctance to impose conditions to protect affected carriers or to include 
affected carriers in the merger. Such conditions would be imposed only to 
enable shippers to receive adequate service and where the ability of the conso-
lidated carrier to obtain the benefits of improved operating efficiency would 
not be jeopardized. Section 1111.2(f) commits the ICC to providing only the 
mandated statutory protection for labor and no more unless evidence can be 
provided indicating the need for more stringent protection because of unusual 
circumstances. 
The next section provides a brief review of the ICC's decisions in post-
4R Act merger applications. 
Implementation of the Statutory Merger Guidelines: Post-1976 
Since the 4R Act, the ICC has adopted a strong pro-merger stance. In a 
comprehensive study of rail merger impacts, legislation and policy the ICC's 
Rail Service Planning Office (RSPO) recommended that the ICC issue a policy 
statement encouraging rail restructuring through the merger process. The 
RSPO advocated end-to-end (i.e., vertical) mergers in particular as having the 
(30) Ibid,p. 133. 
(31) Ibid, p. 128. 
(32) Section 111l.b (a) (2), p. 101. 
(33) Section 1111.1 {a), p. 91. 
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potential for greater long-term advantages accompanied by fewer risks than 
parallel (i.e., horizontal) mergers (34). The RSPO viewed merging as the 
most effective approach to restructuring the U.S. rail network given the general 
inability of the industry over the years to coordinate their operations volun-
tarily by other means (e.g., trackage rights, joint use of facilities and pooling) (35). 
The ICC's merger policy statement and implementation of the statutory 
merger guidelines closely reflect the RSPO's recommendations. The railroads, 
cognizant of the receptiveness of the ICC, have zealously embraced the merger 
strategy. Between 1980 and 1982 four primarily end-to-end consolidations 
representing 55 percent of all rail freight revenues were approved. The ICC 
is currently evaluating the proposed merger between two parallel western 
railroads, the Southern Pacific and the Santa Fe, which, if approved, would 
create the nation's third largest railroad measured by miles of track). The sale 
of government-owned Conrail to the Norfolk Southern is also under review. If 
these two consolidations occur, the five largest railroads would account for 
approximately 83% of all U.S. rail freight revenue. Additionally, several 
consolidations among smaller, regional railroads have also taken place, and 
more are likely to occur. 
A review of the ICC's decisions in the four major consolidations reveals 
that the most heavily weighted criteria in the evaluations of the mergers were 
the impacts upon competition and essential services, and the ICC seemed 
reluctant to impose conditions other than to preserve these two service 
elements (36). 
The ICC considers service to be essential "if there is a sufficient public 
need for the service and adequate alternative transportation is not available ". 
Smith concludes that the ICC, in essence, has substituted the essential services 
standard for the "adequacy of transportation " statutory guideline (37). The 
emphasis is on the merger's impact upon the essential services offered by the 
non-applicant railroads (38). Thus far, the ICC has utilized a theoretical or 
conceptual approach to determining the likely impact upon essential services 
rather than a factual or formulable approach (39). The result has been a strin· 
gent application of essential services guidelines which makes it difficult for both 
(34) Rail Merger Study Final Report, Rail Services Planning Office, Interstate Com· 
merce Commission, Washington, D.C., February 1, 1978, pp. 1-3. 
(35) Ibid, p. 21. 
(36) Daniel Smith, "The Evolution of Rail Merger Policy", Proceedings of the 
Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Forum, Vol. XXIV, Num-
ber 1, 1983, pp. 558-565; and, G. Paul Moates, "Evolving Standards for Rail Consolidation 
Cases Since Enactment of the 4-R Act,", Eastern Transportation Law Seminar, 1981, 
pp. 165-170; and Curtis M. Grimm, "Public Interest Evaluation of Recent Railroad Mer-
gers", Eastern Transportation Law Semmar, 1981, pp. 171-176. 
(37) D. Smith, op. cit., p. 562. 
(38) G.P. Moates, op. cit., p. 165. 
(39) Ibid., p. 170. 
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applicants and protestants to support their positions (40). Unlike its merger 
evaluations of the 1950's and 1960's, the ICC's analyses of the competitive 
effects of recent mergers have been conducted in a manner consistent with that 
applied by the OOJ to the manufacturing sector (41). The ICC noted in its 
Union Pacific-Missouri Pacific-Western Pacific (UP-MP-WP) merger decision: 
We will continue to examine consolidation under the terms of the 
Interstate Commerce Act where competition is but one factor, albeit 
an important one, in determining the public interest. Nonetheless, 
the principles of the antitrust laws, specifically of section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act provide sub-
stantial guidance in our assessment of the competitive impact of rail 
consolidations under the Interstate Commerce Act (42). 
Grimm criticizes the ICC for its misapplication of market share measures 
in the UP-MP-WP merger. Specifically, he argues that the ICC utilized a 
methodology designed to measure parallel (horizontal) impact for its analysis 
of the merger's end-to-end (vertical) impacts. Consequently, Grimm concludes 
that the ICC has underemphasized the vertical foreclosure impacts from end-to-
end mergers ( 4 3). 
B. ICC REGULATION OF TRUCKING MERGERS 
Merger Legislation Prior to 1980 
Whereas the ICC had no authority over railroad mergers the first 33 years 
it regulated the industry, trucking merger regulation commenced with the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the inaugural economic regulation legislation for 
the trucking industry. Section 213(a) (1) granted the ICC authority to appro-
ve trucking mergers found to be consistent with the public interest and to 
prescribe conditions and terms for approved mergers (44). However, no public 
interest guidelines or considerations were provided in the act. 
(40) D. Smith, op. cit., p. 565. 
(41) Curtis M. Grimm, "An Evaluation of Economic Issues in the UP-MP-WP Rail-
road Merger", The Logistics and Transportation Review, Volume 20, Number 3, 1984, 
pp. 245-247. 
(42) Finance Docket No. 30000, Union Pacific Corporation, Pacific Rail System, Inc., 
and Union Pacific Railroad Company - Control - Missouri Pacific Corporation and Mis-
souri Pacific Railroad Company, Interstate Commerce Commission, (served October 20, 
1982), p. 503. 
(43) CM. Grimm, op. cit., 1984, pp. 247-254. 
(44) Transactions involving 20 vehicles or less were subject to less stringent regula-
tion than mergers involving larger carriers. The Transportation Act of 1940 continued 
this policy: large truck mergers were subject to Section 5 regulation while small mergers 
were governed by Section 212 (b). In 1965 the size criterion for small mergers changed to 
less than $300,000 gross operating revenue for the merging fitms for the 12 month period 
prior to the merger. 
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With the passage of the Transportation Act of 1940 Section 213 was 
repealed and trucking mergers became subject to Section 5 of Part I of the 
Interstate Commerce Act. As a result, the Section 5(2) (c) public interest 
considerations employed by the ICC in proposed railroad consolidations were 
also applicable to mergers among trucking firms. Additionally, as with rail 
mergers, approved trucking mergers were exempted from the antitrust laws 
by Section 5(11). 
The next section summarizes the major findings of two studies which in-
vestigated the ICC's implementation of the trucking merger legislation prior 
to the changes brought about by the regulatory reform legislation of 1980. 
Implementation of the Section 5(2) (c) Merger Guidelines: 1940-1980 
Motor carrier firms like the railroads have exhibited a propensity to use 
mergers as a means to growth and expansion. The number of regulated inter-
city motor carriers decreased on the average of 3 7 5 per year during the period 
&om 1940-1969 with the great majority of the decrease due to mergers among 
small trucking firms. From 1957-1967 the ICC approved 467 unifications 
involving the 100 largest regulated interstate truck firms. However, only 14 
of these mergers were between carriers in the top one hundred (45). 
Two studies of the ICC's policy toward trucking mergers involving large 
carriers were published in the mid-1970's. In order to gauge the key factors 
in the ICC's evaluation of and general policy toward trucking mergers, Johnson 
:reviewed 450 ICC decisions selected randomly from the 2'340 Section 5 
cases decided between 1938 and 1972. Further, he identified and added to 
his descriptive study 17 " key " cases not included in his random sample ( 46). 
. Corsi utilized stepwise multiple discriminant analysis to identify the subset of 
·.·" variables which best discriminated between mergers approved and denied by 
the ICC. His sample consisted of 27 merger cases decided during the time 
period 1965-1972 (47). Though not the specific focus of either study, the 
results and conclusions of these studies provide the basis for an assessment 
of the ICC's implementation of the statutory merger guidelines. 
The ICC's evaluation of the trucking mergers' impacts upon adequate 
transportation service seemed to parallel the criteria employed in railroad merger 
decisions. Johnson found improved service (especially faster service, more and 
better timed schedules, decreased loss and damage, better available equipment, 
and faster tracing) to be the most widely acknowledged reason given by the 
(45) J.C. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 55-56. 
(46) Ibid, pp. 60-64. 
(47) Thomas M. Corsi, "The Policy of the ICC in Trucking Merger, Control, and 
Acquisition of Certificate Cases, 1965-1972 ", ICC Practitioners' Journal, Vol. 43, 1976, 
24-38. 
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ICC for authorizing trucking unifications (48). Also, the revival of failing 
trucking firms and expected operating economies (from increased load factors, 
decreased circuitous routes, reduced pick-up and delivery expenses, reduced loss 
and damage claims, reduced maintenance costs, consolidated terminals and other 
facilities, better management, and overall decreased labor costs) were important 
public interest benefits enumerated by the ICC in its merger decisions (49). 
The ICC's policy concerning adversely affected carrier employees in truck-
ing mergers differed significantly from that in railroad mergers. Section 5(2) 
(f) of the Interstate Commerce Act required the ICC to provide protective 
conditions in approved rail mergers which leave rail employees no worse off for 
four years after merger. Such conditions were not required in trucking mergers, 
and the ICC frequently awarded no protection or compensation for adversely 
affected trucking employees. In those few cases where the ICC intervened on 
behalf of trucking labor, the compensation or protection granted was usually 
substantially less than that required in rail mergers (50). 
As in the regulation of rail mergers, trucking merger impacts upon inter-
modal and intramodal competition were scrutinized carefully by the ICC. John-
son noted that the ICC generally applied two criteria in deciding if a consoli-
dation was consistent with the public interest: the expected public benefits 
arising from a merger and the effect upon competing carriers (51). The impact 
upon intermodal competition played a significant role in the ICC's early deci-
sions, but virtually disappeared as a consideration in later cases. 
The P.I.E. -Keeshin merger case in 1950 was the last "key" case in 
which the impact of a trucking merger upon competing railroads was considered 
significant. The ICC denied this proposed transcontinental trucking merger 
on the grounds that it would divert a substantial volume of traffic from com-
peting railroads and thus jeopardize the railroads' ability to meet those needs 
of commerce and the national defense which could not be met by other modes 
alone (52). Shortly after the P.I.E. -Keeshin decision, the ICC reversed 
itself in two "key" decisions rendered in 1954 and 1960. Essentially, the ICC 
concluded that motor carrier unifications would not significantly increase the 
basic financial difficulties of the railroad industry, and that the growth and 
improved service performance of the trucking industry should not be restricted 
to protect the railroads (53). Thereafter, the intermodal competitive issue was 
largely ignored in trucking merger cases. 
In determining the impact of a proposed trucking merger on intramodal 
competition the ICC generally drew a distinction between mergers offering a 
(48) J.C. Johnson, op. cit., p. 65. 
(49) Ibid, pp. 68-80. 
(50) Ibid, pp. 76-78. 
(51) Ibid, p. 87. 
(52) Ibid, pp. 82-85. 
(53) Ibid, pp. 85-87. 
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" new " service, analogous to the attainment of new geographic operating author-
ity, and an "improved" service, such as that arising from the merging of inter-
lining carriers. Typically, the ICC ruled that protesting carriers had no legiti-
mate reason to contest mergers producing an improved service. However, in 
new service cases the ICC weighed the benefits to the shipping public against 
the adverse effects on the protesting carriers (54). Corsi's study supports the 
contentions that the impact on competing motor carriers was weighed heavily 
by the ICC as he discovered the number of protesting carriers (above a crit-
ical mass) and their projected magnitude of revenue losses to be significant 
factors in the ICC's decisions {55). Johnson concurred and noted that the 
ICC had traditionally held that existing carriers who had made large investments 
to improve their service to the shipping public should be protected from additional 
competition as long as the existing service was adequate and efficient (56). The 
ICC was clearly more concerned with mergers' impacts upon competitors than 
with the impacts upon competition. 
Johnson concluded that the ICC generally favored trucking mergers, espe-
cially those of an end-to-end type where prior interlining existed (57). This con-
clusion was based solely on his analysis and interpretation of ICC merger case 
law as the ICC had no stated trucking merger policy prior to 1980. With the 
advent of regulatory reform the ICC decided to greatly reduce its regulation of 
trucking mergers as the next section reveals. 
Merger Legislation 1980 and Post-1980 
Though the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 did not alter the public interest 
considerations for trucking mergers, the Staggers Act contained an amendment 
to section 11344 of the Interstate Commerce Act which addressed transactions 
not involving control or merger of at least two class I railroads. Section 228 
(d) of the Staggers Act mandated approval of such mergers unless: 
(1) As a result of the transaction, there is likely to be a substantial lessen-
ing of competition, creation of a monopoly, or restraint of trade in 
freight surface transportation in any region of the United States, and 
(2) The anticompetitive aspects of the transactions outweigh the public 
interest in meeting significant transportation needs. 
The ICC initially concluded that Section 228 (d) referred only to rail mer-
gers not involving at least two class I carriers. However, passage of the Bus 
Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 led the ICC to conclude that Congress intended 
(54) Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
(55) T .M. Corsi, op. cit., pp. 35-36. 
(56) ].C. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 92-94. 
(57) Ibid, p. 162. 
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Section 228 (d) to apply to motor carriers of property (58). Also, Section 21 (b) 
of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act gave the ICC authority to exempt trucking 
mergers from regulation if: (1) the ICC determined that such regulation is not 
necessary to carry out national transportation policy, and (2) either the transaction 
is of limited scope or merger regulation is not needed to protect shippers from 
the abuse of market power. As a result, the ICC recently issued a ruling which 
greatly reduces its role in proposed trucking mergers. 
ICC's Current Trucking Merger Policy 
The ICC had contemplated reducing its regulation of trucking mergers prior 
to the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (59). However, the first ICC 
ruling providing for decreased regulation did not occur until November 
of 1982 (60). The ICC decided to utilize its new authority to exempt trucking 
mergers from the provisions of section 11343 provided the merger displayed no 
·potential anti-competitive effects. The ICC had to issue a decision analyzing the 
transaction regardless of whether the proceeding was opposed. Of the 800 peti-
tions for exemption filed subsequent to this ruling, only one was contested by the 
DOJ on anti-competitive grounds (61). Consequently, the ICC went one step 
further in removing itself from the regulation of trucking mergers by granting 
a class exemption for all trucking mergers in Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub- No. 57), 
decided November 21, 1984. 
Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub- No. 57) provides an automatic exemption for all 
proposed trucking mergers unless the ICC receives a written complaint within 
30 days concerning the potential anticompetitive effects or adverse labor effects 
of the merger. Upon receipt of any such nonfrivolous complaint, the proposed 
merger will be subjected to a detailed analysis. In assessing the potential for a 
merged trucking firm's abuse of market power, the ICC noted: 
Although the class exemption procedures will facilitate motor car-
rier consolidations, it is unlikely that undesirable market concen-
(58) In 49 CFR Ch. X, Vol. 47, No. 219, [Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-53)], Motor Carrier 
Consolidation Procedures; General Policy Statement, November 12, 1982, pp. 51132-51133, 
the ICC noted that by reinstating the pre-Staggers Act merger criteria upon the bus indu-
stry but not the trucking industry, Congress had intended Section 228 (d) to apply to 
trucking mergers. 
(59) In Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub.No. 38 F) Antitrust and Competitive Factors in Motor 
Carrier Finance Cases, Decided January 11, 1980, the ICC proposed lessening the filing 
requirements for " less significant transactions " (i.e., those where combined gross annual 
revenues of applicants did not exceed the median revenue :figure for the largest 100 trucking 
firms). This proposal was never implemented. 
(60) Ex Parte No. 400 (Sub-No. 1), Procedures for Handling Exemptions Filed by 
Motor Carriers of Property Under 49 U.S.C. 11343, Effective November 19, 1982. 
(61) Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub.No. 57), Exemption of Certain Transactions Under 49 
U.S.C. 11343, Decided Novembet 21, 1984, p. 6. 
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tration and competitive abuses will result. The presence of relati-
vely low economic barriers to entry (combined with a corresponding 
reduction in the many regulatory barriers) assures that individual 
firms will not be able to raise prices or reduce the level of service 
to supra-competitive levels for an extended period of time. Such 
anticompetitive behavior would quickly result in the growth of pri-
vate carriage and the entry of other for-hire competitors offering 
more market responsive price and service options. DO] also reco-
gnizes that ease of entry is an important consideration in whether 
to challenge a merger (62). 
The ICC's current attitude toward trucking merger regulation is a very 
permissive one. The ICC's proclivity for favoring mergers as a means of pro-
moting competition was evident shortly after the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 
and well before its recent policy statements. In December of 1980 the ICC 
· announced its approval of the merger of two trucking firms which were direct 
:1nmpetitors in 27 city-pairs and which created the eighth largest trucking firm in 
nation (63). The ICC noted that the combined firm would have only 2% 
the national market and that competition in the trucking industry would be 
~>,.;jDCl'eased due to the creation of a firm financially stronger that its components (64). 
formal statements of policy merely acknowledge the ICC's receptiveness to 
mergers. 
The pre-1980 policy on common ownership and thus mergers creating in-
--ated " transportation companies " has been viewed as negative and restric-
(65). The general policy has been to confine transport ownership to modal 
. .uuw1daries. This policy has some interesting and important dimensions. First, 
~~,_~cept for railroad control of motor carriers and barge lines, the Interstate Com-
Act contains no specific provisions dealing with intermodal acquisi-
(66). All other cross-modal mergers except rail-barge and rail-truck are 
·;~rued under the general consolidation provisions of the Interstate Commerce 
(62) Ibid. 
(63) Denis Breen, "Trucking Mergers and Public Policy", Presentation at a confer-
ence on " Competition in Trasportation Sector - Impact of Antitrust Law and Compe-
:fion Policy on the Airline, Trucking, Railroad and Maritime Industries " sponsored by 
Federal Bar Association and the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C. May 
1984. 
(64) James C. Johnson, "Going, Going, Gone! - The ICC's Regulation of Trucking 
", ICC Practitioners' Journal, May-June 1984, Vol. 51, No. 4, p. 392. 
(65) Byron Nupp, "Regulatory Standards In Common Ownership in Transportation", 
Practitioners' Journal, Vol. 34, November-December 1966, p. 21 and Donald Harper, 
sportation, Englewood Oiffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978, pp. 544. 
(66) D. Harper, op. cit., p. 545. 
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Act. Second, there has been a historic desire to treat cross-modal combinations 
in a more restrictive way than intramodal combinations (67). This policy of 
placing additional restrictions on rail control of barge lines and motor carriers 
was established when the railroads dominated the transportation market and 
the water carrier and motor carrier industries were in their infancies. 
Implicit in this restrictive policy has been the general reluctance of both 
the Congress and the ICC to trade-off the potential public benefits for the 
possible harmful effects of either rail-barge or rail-truck mergers. Although 
several different types of arguments have been used to oppose the develop-
ment of integrated transportation companies, the primary argument concerns 
the potential anticompetitive effects of such mergers, (e.g., predatory pricing 
used to drive out the independent operators) (68). Benefits of intermodal 
consolidations include: reduction of duplicative expenses and economies of 
scope (resulting from the horizontal nature of such mergers), improved and 
more cost effective intermodal transportation service (resulting from the im-
proved economic and physical coordination inherent in an intermodal move 
controlled by one carrier), improved pricing of intermodal services (resulting 
from the ability to construct and price an entire intermodal move), and increased 
capability for railroads to offer new marketing opportunities for shippers (69). 
Included in the above benefits are the usual arguments of the benefits of 
"one-stop shopping" such as reduced transactions costs. It is also argued 
that an integrated company would more likely route traffic to gain the maxi-
mum cost and service advantages from each mode under its control given it 
would maintain the traffic under any routing (70). With respect to private 
benefits, such acquisitions can increase a railroad's profits by extending its 
market territory that is normally limited by its rail route system. In addition, 
particularly in the case of rail-controlled trucking operations, the railroad can 
increase its profits by substituting motor carrier service for parallel, inefficient 
rail service (e.g., service on light density branch lines). 
Proving one transportation expert wrong, who predicted several years 
ago that the usual ICC position on rail-barge and rail-truck mergers would not 
change unless Congress specifically directed the ICC to do so, the ICC 
recently has dropped its reluctance to make the trade-off between the benefits 
and costs of intermodal mergers (71). By its decisions in recent rulemakings 
(67) B. Nupp, op. cit., p. 39. 
(68) See Robert C. Lieb, "Intermodal Ownership: Experience and Evaluation", 
ICC Practitioners' journal, Vol. 38, July-August 1971 for a discussion of the other argu-
ments in opposition to integrated ownership. 
(69) G. Paul Moates, "Transport Industry Concentration and Cross-Ownership -
The Future of Intermodal Competition", Eastern Transportation Law Seminar, 1984, 
pp. 74-75. 
(70) D. Harper, op. cit., p. 544. 
(71) Ibid, p. 545. 
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and two important cases involving rail-barge and rail-truck merger transactions, 
the ICC has made it easier for railroads to acquire barge lines and motor 
carriers. 
With this brief review of the intermodal merger benefits, the next section 
provides an analysis of rail-barge mergers. 
A. ICC REGULATION OF RAIL-BARGE MERGERS 
Rail-Barge Merger Legislation 
The ICC was granted authority over rail-barge mergers in the Panama 
Canal Act of 1912, eight years before it received complete authority over 
railroad mergers. Congress passed the Panama Canal Act to maximize the use 
of the soon to be completed Panama Canal, to promote intercarrier compe-
tition and to protect water transportation from rail domination (72). The act 
amended then Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act to make it unlawful for 
any railroad or pipeline to own, lease, operate or control any water carrier or 
any vessel carrying freight or passengers through the Panama Canal or else-
where with which such railroad or pipeline does or may compete. The ICC 
was permitted to allow a railroad to continue control of a competing water 
carrier purchased before 1912 if the water carrier did not operate through the 
Panama Canal and if the water carrier was operated in the public interest 
advantageously to interstate commerce and allowed competition, without reduc-
tion, on the route by water under consideration (73). 
The Transportation Act of 1940, the last legislation dealing with rail-barge 
mergers, authorized the ICC to approve new acquisitions by railroads of com-
peting water carrier not using the Panama Canal subject to these same 
standards (7 4). 
Subsequent legislative attempts to repeal or modify the provisions of the 
Panama Canal Act have been unsuccessful. Despite apparent attempts by the 
railroad industry to have the provisions stricken in the Transportation Act 
of 1958, Congress refused to repeal or even modify any of the provisions. A 
year later Senate Bill 1355, which would have permitted railroads to engage 
in water carrier operations on the inland waterway system, died in committee. 
Twenty years later Congress rejected the ICC's recommendation to repeal the 
(72) Samuel P. Delisi, "Coordinated Freight Transportation Service: Legal and Reg-
ulatory Aspects - Part II", ICC Practitioners' Journal, Vol. 34, May-June 1967, p. 556. 
(73) See Interstate Commerce Commission Decision, Finance Docket No. 30125, 
Water Transport Association for Declaratory Order-American Commercial Lines Voting 
Trust (served July 1, 1983), page 7 for a discussion of this issue. 
(74) See Ibid, p. 7 and G. Paul Moates, op. cit., 1984, p. 70 for differing views of 
the nature of this amendment. 
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Panama Canal Act. The Panama Canal Act also survived the sweeping changes 
made in the regulation of railroads by the Staggers Act and the less ambitious 
changes in the 4R Act. Most recently, The Transportation Improvement Act 
of 1983 (Senate Bill 48), which would have, inter alia, repealed the Panama 
Canal Act, died in committee (75). 
ICC Administration of Rail-Barge Merger Provisions 
The Panama Canal Act provisions, now housed in section 11321 in the 
recodified Interstate Commerce Act, are both prohibitive and permissive. They 
prohibit railroads without exception from acquiring water carriers operated 
through the Panama Canal. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 11321 
authorizes the ICC to permit a railroad to own a water carrier with which it 
does or many compete for traffic if the transaction will still allow that water 
carrier to be operated in the public interest advantageously to interstate com-
merce and that it will still allow competition, without reduction, on the water 
route in question. Although clearly giving the ICC the responsibility to deter-
mine whether a railroad competes or may compete and when a merger meets 
the public interest and competitive criteria, Section 11321 does not provide any 
standards or guidelines to assist the ICC in making such determinations. It 
should also be noted that the rail-barge mergers are also subject to sections 11343 
and 11344 of the Interstate Commerce Act, which contain the general consol-
idation, merger, and acquisition of control provisions. The important question 
in determining the impact of the Panama Canal Act on the amount of rail-
barge mergers is, how has the ICC interpreted these somewhat vague standards. 
ICC Interpretation - Prior to 1980 The initial cases involved railroads 
requesting permission to continue their control over water carriers. Although 
in an early important case, the Lake Line Applications under Panama Canal 
Act, the ICC denied continued control, many other requests for continued 
control were approved (76). These cases did not involve the inland waters 
other than the Great Lakes. In another series of cases, the ICC approved 
the continued rail control of ferry services or car Boat or lighterage services in 
major ports, services which the ICC generally viewed as being embraced by 
the term "railroad" rather than "water carrier" (77). The ICC had few 
cases and never authorized a railroad's acquisition of a competing barge line 
(75) See Richard A. Zellner and Smith R. Brittingham, III, " Common Rail-Barge 
Ownership: The Destruction of Effective Competition", Eastern Transportation Law 
Seminar, 1984, p. 81 and Brief of Petitioner, Water Transport Association, Water Transport 
Association vs. CSX Corporation, Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of 
America, D.C. Court of Appeals, no date, pp. 23-25 for a discussion of these legislative 
attempts to repeal or modify the Panama Canal Act. 
(76) S.P. Delisi, op. cit., p. 558. 
(77) B. Nupp, op. cit., p. 24. 
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on the inland waters other than the Great Lakes {78). Several 
ftlll-oargc mergers were approved upon the finding that the railroad and barge 
~· not compete. As of 1978, only two barge lines were controlled by 
the railroads (79). 
A review of the case law indicates that the ICC has not developed firm 
~andards for rail-barge mergers. In the 1972 Southern Railway Application 
the ICC did delineate certain guidelines used in past cases for determining 
railroad and the water carrier "do or may compete": (1) if the railroad 
water carrier serve two or more common points, and (2) if they actively 
jfr:·.tompete for the same traffic. The ICC also noted a railroad may be found 
to be competitive with its affiliated water carrier, despite serving two or 
. more common points, because of the nature of the traffic, service differences, 
i.nd/or rate differences between the railroad and water carriers, or extreme 
drcuitous routing of either the rail route or the water route (80). 
The guidelines developed by the ICC to determine if the transaction will 
allow the water carrier to be operated in the public interest advantageously 
on whether the merger would enhance intermodal rail-barge moves, and 
:::Whether the water carrier would be maintained as a viable entity by the rail-
(81). The ICC recently stated the public interest test is closely related 
the competition test - if the water carrier continues to operate as an active 
its operations will be considered to be in the public interest and 
~vantageous to interstate commerce (82). 
To determine if a transaction will still allow competition without reduc-
on the water route in question, the ICC has traditionally adopted a three-
approach to competitive analysis, examining the reduction in competition 
~~>rnrPPn the target water carrier and the acquiring railroad, the competition 
the consolidated rail-barge entity and other water carriers, and the 
ntra-barge competition among the non-included water carriers. A finding that 
railroad will dominate the acquired water carrier, that the rail-barge combi-
will have substantial economic and financial advantages over non-inte-
water carriers, and that the service now being provided by the non-
~uded water carriers is adequate has been used to support a finding that the 
, will lead to reduction in competition on the water route in question (83). 
,-;. 
(78) R.A. Zellner and S.R. Brittingham, III, op. cit., p. 82. 
(79) Multimodal Ownership Patterns: Selected Finandal and Operating Data, Office of 
~:Regulatory Policy, Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation, January 12, 
1981, p. 6. 
(80) Southern Railway Co. Section 5 (15) Application, 342 I.C.C. 416, 430-432 
(81) Illinois Central Railroad Company et al - Control, ETC - John I. Hay Com-
: pany, 317 r.c.c., 39, 53. 
(82) Interstate Commerce Commission Decision, Finance Docket No. 30300, CSX 
Corporation - Control - American Commercial Lines, Inc. (served September, 1984), 
16. 
(83) Illinois Central Railroad Company, p. 54. 
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As noted above, rail-barge mergers are also subject to Sections 11343 
and 11344 of the Interstate Commerce Act. Because the criteria in Section 
11344 bars a rail-barge merger transaction only if the transaction would result 
in substantial lessening of competition and if the anticompetitive effects out-
weigh the public benefits, the standards for approval are less stringent under 
Section 11344 than Section 11321 and thus usually not controlling (84). 
ICC Interpretation - Post. 1980 Since 1980, the date of significant 
regulatory reform in transportation regulation in the United States, the ICC 
has had only one rail-barge merger transaction to review under Section 11321 
-the Panama Canal Act. However, the ICC decision in the case, involving 
the third largest railroad in the United States, the CSX Corporation (CSX), 
and either the first or second largest barge line, the American Commercial Barge 
Lines, Inc. (ACBL), has been viewed by some as a dramatic shift in ICC 
policy and an emasculation of the Panama Canal Act. (85). In June of 1983 
the CSX acquired the Texas Gas Corporation which owned American Commercial 
Line (ACL) which, in turn, wholly owned the American Commercial Barge Lines, 
Inc. (ACBL). The CSX placed the shares of ACL in an independent voting 
trust pending ICC approval of its application, filed in November of 1983, to 
acquire the barge line under Sections 113 21 and 113 44. After extensive 
hearings and oral argument, the ICC issued its unanimous decision approving 
the consolidation in September of 1984 (86). A Petition for Review of the 
ICC order is pending in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit with a 
mid-1985 decision anticipated (87). 
A review of the ICC decision and the arguments used by the applicant 
and protestants provides an insight into the possible impact of this decision 
on future rail-barge mergers. The CSX argued that four basic benefits would 
result from the merger, which it viewed primarily as being a vertical integra-
tion: (1) operational savings; (2) more efficient joint ratemaking; (3) an ex-
panded market perspective; and ( 4) reduction or elimination of transaction 
costs (88). CSX further argued that though CSX and ACBL do compete in 
one sense, they do not compete in the narrower sense that is the focus of Section 
11321 (a) (89). In addition, it argued that the transaction would not reduce 
competition on the water route in question primarily due to the competitive 
nature of and the ease of entry into the barge industry (90). 
(84) Interstate Commerce Commission, Decision, Finance Docket No. 30300, p. 17. 
(85) R.A. Zellner and S.R. Brittingham, III, op. cit., p. 83. 
(86) Interstate Commerce Commission, Decision, Finance Docket No. 30300. 
(87) G.P. Moates, op. cit., 1984, p. 72. 
(88) John Snow, Verified Statement, Finance Docket No. 30300, CSX Corporation -
Control - American Commercial Lines, Inc., November 4, 1983, p. 19. 
(89) Interstate Commerce Commission, Decision, Finance Docket No. 30300, Appen-
dix C. 
(90) Application of CSX Corporation and American Commercial Lines, Inc., Finance 
Docket No. 30300, CSX Corporation- Control -American Commercial Lines, Inc., Vol. 1, 
November 1, 1983, pp. 52-53. 
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The U.S. Department of Transportation and a number of states actively 
in the proceedings and generally supported the application. On 
hand, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Water Transport 
(representing most of the barge lines), the National Coal Associa-
several utilities, and several states, primarily coal producing states, ac-
the application. The opposition arguments focused upon the 
puLc:mnu anticompetitive effects of the merger and the high level of intermodal 
under the present regime of separate ownership. Interestingly 
OOJ did not file comments but did file a post-hearing review (91). 
The ICC found that the CSX and ACBL did compete under section 11321 
and thus had to rule on whether the transaction passed the " reduction of 
I~~· competition " and "public interest" tests of Section 11321 (b). After exam-
·{\ ining the data and arguments with respect to the level of concentration and 
, ease of entry into the barge industry, and the various arguments concerning 
~> market foreclosure and evasion of ICC rate regulation, the ICC decided that 
.··~· the CSX-ACBL operation would be effectively constrained from successfully 
'i·· engaging in any type of anticompetitive activity and thus would not reduce 
·~ .. cX,mpetition on the water route in question (92). 
Js), 
~ · . !hr~ asp~ts of the decision_ with respect to anticom~iv_e is?ues m:rit 
·.~·;!·.· .. .····hi .. ghhghtmg. Ftrst, the IC~ establtshed _a new sta~dard by r~Jectmg lts ~oldmg 
· c . m the John L. Hay case m 1962 whtch essentially associated a findmg of 
· ·}harm to the acquired water carrier or to one of its competitors, defined as a 
: ·;::.c:bange in competitive status, with a finding of reduced competition on the 
:,rinvolved water route. The position adopted in this decision is that harm to 
tcompetitors does not imply harm to competition (93). Second, the ICC made 
;;i•.• wide use of the 1984 DO J merger guidelines in its analysis of the proposed 
~·:;. ~erger. For example, it cited the DOJ merger guidelines to support its posi-
.·: tion that an increase in market concentration is not dispositive of the compe-
tion issue. The ICC stated that a consolidation is not anticompetive unless it 
creates or enhances market power which is defined as the ability of one or 
more firms to profitably maintain prices above competitive levels for a signi-
. Bcant period of time. Its decision with respect to the delineation of the 
relevant market and its use of ease of entry in this case were also supported 
by the DOJ guidelines (94). Third, the ICC decided to retain jurisdiction 
for five years to oversee and consider possible anticompetitive effects of the 
merger (95). 
(91) Interstate Commerce Commission, Decision, Finance Docket No. 30300, Ap-
pendix C. 
(92) Ibid, pp. 27-45. 
(93) Ibid, p. 19. 
(94) Ibid, pp. 23 and 36. 
(95) Ibid, p. 45. 
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Based upon the projected operating savings from the consolidation and 
the single system service available to the shipper (" one-stop " shopping), the 
ICC also found that transaction would ailow ACBL to be operated in the 
public interest advantageously to interstate commerce (96). The ICC add-
itionally approved the merger under the less stringent provisions of section 
11344 (d) which also involved an analysis of the competitive effects of the 
merger but was focused on the regional effects (97). 
It is.not clear what impact this decision will have on the amount of rail-
barge mergers in the future. Although some have argued the ICC decision 
on the CSX-ACBL case nullified the Panama Canal Act, no other rail-barge 
mergers have been proposed. Other railroads may be waiting for the Court 
of Appeals decision or view the decision as simply reflecting the pro-deregula-
tion ICC membership at the time of the decision. It is clear, however, that 
the ICC was influenced by the 1984 DOJ guidelines, which are pro-merger. 
In addition, the ICC stated it would examine transactions proposing rail-
barge affiliations under the Panama Canal Act consistent with its recently 
established policies in Ex Parte No. 438, Acquisitions of Motor Carriers by 
Railroads, which makes it easier for railroads to acquire motor carriers unre-
stricted by the traditional "auxiliary and supplemental " conditions (98). These 
policies will be examined in the next section. 
B. ICC REGULATION OF RAIL-TRUCK MERGERS 
Rail-Truck Merger Legislation 
Despite the strong ICC opposition to rail ownership of water carriers 
in the Lake Line Applications Under Panama Canal Act case in 1915, the ICC 
concluded several years later in 1928 that railroads should be specifically autho-
rized to engage in motor carriage of both passengers and property either in 
conjunction with their rail services or as independent line haul providers (99). 
In 1934, however, ICC Commissioner Eastman testified before a Congressional 
committee that while railroads should be permitted to use trucks freely in 
connection with their rail services, he did not advocate the unrestricted use 
of trucks by railroads. The deteriorating economic condition of the trucking 
industry undoubtedly explained much of this change of ICC policy (100). 
(96) Ibid, p. 45. 
(97) Ibid, p. 3. 
(98) Ibid, p.14. 
{99) See Lake Line Applications Under Panama Canal Act, 33 I.C.C. 699 (1915) 
and Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operation, 140 I.C.C. 685 (1928). 
(100) Michael Erenberg and Bruce M. Kasson, "Railroad-Motor Carrier Intermodal 
Ownership", Transportation Law Journal, Vol. XII, No. 1, 1981, p. 80. 
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granted authority over rail-truck mergers in the Motor 
Act of 1935. Railroads {and water carriers and pipelines) were not 
from acquiring or merging with a motor carrier but the conditions 
which they could acquire motor carriers were established. Section 213 
(1) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 stated that the ICC could not 
aoorove a non-motor carrier-truck merger unless it found that the transaction 
would promote the public interest by enabling such a non-motor 
to use truck service to public advantage in its operations and would 
unduly restrain competition. It has been argued that Congress passed 
provision to prevent rail monopoly over the much smailer motor carrier 
industry while at the same time permitting railroads to use motor carriage in 
coordination with their own rail operations (101). 
In the Transportation Act of 1940, Section 213 (a) (1) was re-enacted 
: IS section 5 (2) (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Two important substan-
changes were made: (1) restrictions against common ownership were 
:;;narrowed to apply only to rail ownership of motor carriers, and (2) the Ian-
of the new section was liberalized to enable the ICC to grant an acqui-
if it found the transactions to be " consistent with the public interest " 
than requiring that the transaction "promote" the public interest (102). 
Although neither the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 nor the Staggers Act 
addressed the issue of rail-truck carrier merger, the ICC has cited 
recently to support a more liberal rail-truck merger policy {103). The 
i)rovisions in both acts stressing competition and intermodal transportation, 
the easier entry and less restrictive operating certificates policies of the 
Carrier Act of 1980 were cited to support these changes (104). Most 
The Transportation Improvement Act of 1983 (Senate Bill 48), which 
, inter alia, made it much easier for rails to acquire motor carriers, 
in committee. 
Administration of Rail-Truck Merger Provisions 
Since 1940, ICC decisions with respect to rail-truck acquisitions have 
based upon the Congressional policy that rail-truck mergers should be 
~•nn1'mrPrl only if the ICC finds the transaction is consistent with the public 
will enable the rail carrier to use motor carrier transportation to 
advantage in its operations, and will not unreasonably restrain compe-
This language is now found in Section 11344 (c) of the recodified Inter-
Commerce Act. 
(101) Ibid, pp.77-78. 
(102) Ibid, p. 84. 
(103) Federal Register, Vol. 49, No. 147, Monday, July 30, 1984 (Policy Statement, 
Ex Parte No. 438, (Acquisition of Motor Carriers by Railroads), p. 30376. 
(104) G.P. Moates, op. cit., 1984, p. 73. 
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ICC Interpretation - Prior to 1980 The small number of rail-motor 
carrier firms suggests, and others have argued, that rail-truck merger transactions 
have been limited by Section 11344 {c) as interpreted by the ICC (105). As 
of 1978, there were only about 19 motor freight carriers controlled by rail-
roads and seven of these arrangements were granted under the " grandfather " 
provisions in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (106). 
In its interpretation of this section, with its general language, the ICC 
held the three words " in its operations " to be restrictive during this time 
period. This interpretation was manifested in the doctrines the ICC establish-
ed early on for non-motor carriers to meet in order acquire a motor carrier. 
These doctrines, " auxiliary and supplemental " and " special circumstances ", 
are not found in the Interstate Commerce Act. 
The " auxiliary and supplemental " doctrine was established in the first 
rail-truck acquisition case. The ICC interpreted the phrase " in its operations " 
to mean the trucking service had to be auxiliary and supplementary to train 
service (107). In subsequent cases, the meaning of the phrase "auxiliary and 
supplementary " was clarified with the limitation clearly on the type of trucking 
service performed and not solely on the geographical area of operations. In 
a 1941 case, the ICC enunciated the basic restrictions which were applied to 
rail-truck mergers until recently. 
1. The traffic must be railroad traffic, moving under the railroad's 
responsibility, under rail billing and rail rates. This restriction does 
not exclude all-motor movements of such traffic, providing they are 
not forbidden by a subsequent restriction. 
2. The carrier may not serve any point that is not a station on the 
railroad. 
3. Shipments are limited to those received from or delivered to 
the railroad on a through rail bill of lading covering a prior or sub-
sequent rail haul. 
4. " Key point " restriction can be imposed which means that ship-
ments may not be transported by the carrier between any listed major 
points on the rail line or through or to those points (108). 
(105) Ointon Whitehurst, Jr., ed. Forming Multimodal Transportation Companies, 
Washington, D.C.; American Enterprise Institute, 1978, pp. 73 and 79. 
(106) Multimodal Ownership Patterns: Selected Financial and Operating Data, p. 3. 
This number could understate the number of rail-truck mergers if the trucking firms acquir-
ed by a carrier are subsequendy consolidated under one name or are later sold. 
(107) Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc. - Control - Barker, 1 M.C.C. 101, 1936. 
(108) National Transportation Policy Study Commission, "Motor Carrier Entry Control 
Modification: Railroad Trucking Restrictions and Common Ownership" Working Paper No. 12. 
The Institute of Urban and Regional Research, the University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, 
no date, p. 14. 
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The introduction of piggyback service made these restrictions less effective 
in keeping rail-affiliated trucking service from encroaching upon the traffic of 
motor carriers. In response, in the 1960's, the ICC tightened the restrictions 
by authorizing substituted piggyback service only where one piggyback loading 
facility replaced several others at which the service was actually being provided 
and where the new service was being substituted for uneconomical merchandise 
service (109). 
In a series of cases starting in 1936, the ICC developed the doctrine of 
"special circumstances " which justified granting a rail-truck merger without 
the usual "auxiliary and supplemental" restriction (110). This doctrine was 
created to avoid creating certain problems such as the lack of any service 
whatsoever, rail abandonment, or poor and inefficient service. The applicant 
first had to show that the proposed transaction would enable the railroad to 
use motor vehicle service to public advantage in its operations and would not 
unduly restrain competition, and then demonstrate that conditions to qualify 
for " special circumstances " existed ( 111). 
ICC Interpretation - Post 1980 Since the regulatory reform legislation 
passed in 1980, the ICC has been very active with respect to rail-truck mergers. 
In policy statements issued in Ex Parte MC-156, Applications for Motor Car-
riers Operating Authority by Railroads and Rail Affiliates, 132 M.C.C. 978 
(1982) and Ex Parte 438, Acquisition of Motor Carriers by Railroads (1984), 
the ICC eliminated the "special circumstances " doctrine (112). The ICC 
characterized the " special circumstances " policy as being a presumptive policy 
against rail carriers acquiring truck lines and as having a chilling effect on 
. the development of intermodal operations ( 113). By rejecting the " special 
circumstances " doctrine, the ICC has implicitly redefined the phrase " in its 
operations " as meaning the overall transportation operations of the acquiring 
(109) Ibid, pp. 15-17. 
(110) See M. Erenberg and B.M. Kasson, op. cit., p. 89 for a list of ICC cases. 
(111) The ICC has found "special circumstances" where (1) the vendee was small 
and thus not a threat to competition in the territory; (2) the application was unopposed; 
(3) no other transportation service was available or the particular type of service needed 
Was unavailable; (4) the existing services were inefficient; (5} the area to be served was 
sparsely populated, or (6) the rights to be acquired duplicate, to a certain extent, rights 
already held but which are not now restricted, Ibid, p. 91. 
(112) The ICC early on applied the acquisition restrictions, i.e., the "auxiliary and 
supplementary " doctrine, to applications for new authority from non-motor carrier applicants. 
Although there was no expressed restrictions in the statutory language, a literal reading of 
the language would have led to circumvention of the policy of the proviso in section 11344 
'(c) if these restrictions were not applied to applications for new authority. 
(113) Interstate Commerce Commission, Decision, Ex Parte No. 438, Acquisition of 
Carriers by Railroads, (served July 27, 1984), pp. 1 and 15. 
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rail carrier. The decision has been appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (114). 
It should be noted that the language in Section 11344 (c), the rail-truck 
merger provision, was not changed. Opponents (predominantly motor carriers) 
argued that Congress affirmed the " special circumstances " doctrine by not 
amending either the National Transportation Policy regarding " to preserve 
and recognize the inherent advantage of each mode" (which the ICC used in 
the past to help support the presumptive policy against rail-truck mergers) or 
Section 11344 (c) (115). The ICC, supported by the rail industry and the 
U.S. Department of Transportation, argued that the "special circumstances" 
doctrine was an agency policy " created and transformed by the agency itself ", 
and thus can be modified with changing economic and regulatory environ-
ments (116). The ICC based its new policy statement on the change in the 
relative economic positions of the rail and trucking industries in the United 
States since 1935 and the new emphasis on competition and intermodalism in 
the Interstate Commerce Act resulting from amendments added by the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1980 and the Staggers Act (117). The ICC stated that it no 
longer thought the best method of preserving the inherent advantages of each 
mode is through the artificial separation of the modes (118). Finally, the ICC 
stated that this policy change does not vitiate Section 11344 (c). Railroads 
seeking to acquire a motor carrier must still meet the requirements embodie<;l 
in Section 11344 (c). The ICC simply will not routinely impose supplemental 
and auxiliary conditions upon motor carriers acquired by railroads absent a 
showing of special circumstances but it rather will decide whether to impose 
such conditions based upon the facts of each individual case (119). 
It is too early to determine the impact of these decisions on the amount 
of proposed and ICC permitted rail-truck merger transactions. The elimination 
of the " special circumstances " doctrine has undoubtedly made truck acquisi-
tions by railroads more attractive. Within a month of the ICC decision in 
Ex Parte 438, the Norfolk Southern applied to the ICC to acquire control 
of North American Van Lines, Inc. for $315 million. Recently, the Burlington 
Northern announced its plan to purchase a group of regional motor carriers (120). 
The ICC unanimous decision in April, 1985 approving the Norfolk 
Southern-North American Van Lines consolidation, the first major rail-truck 
merger transaction since the ICC decision in Ex Parte No. 438, merits a brief 
(114) G.P. Moates, op. cit., 1984, p. 73. 
(115) Ex Parte No. 438, p. 8. 
(116) Ibid, p. 8. 
(117) Ibid, p. 17. 
(118) Ibid, p. 14. 
(119) Ibid, p. 13. 
(120) See Patricia Cavanaugh, "BN Planning Network of TL Carriers", Transport 
Topics, May 13, 1985, pp. 1 and 35 and "Burlington Northern Purchase", Wall Street 
Journal, July 8, 1985, p. 9. 
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[ifevj:ew (121). In August of 1984 the application to allow the Norfolk 
:'Southern Corporation (Norfolk Southern) to acquire the North American Van 
· trucking operations from Pepsico, Inc. was filed with the ICC. The rail-
merger involved one of the largest railroads already involved in other 
of transportation and the sixth largest motor carrier firm in the United 
(122). The case was considered under Section 11344 (c) and Section 
44 (d), the latter section also being used in the CSX-ACBL merger case 
i',ltiscussed above. The ICC noted that Section 11344 (c) is more exacting 
Section 11344 (d) and thus should be controlling(123). 
The applicants were supported by the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
.. J number of shippers and several states. The applicants were opposed by the 
; :!r .. , .. n.,t~>...,, the United Transportation Union (a rail union), and Regular 
Carrier Conference of the American Trucking Associations. The 
"t;);;~llcants argued that operating efficiency, new intermodal services and in-
. competition would result without any anticompetitive effects (124). 
opposition arguments were that it would allow the Norfolk Southern 
effective rate regulation, reinforce Norfolk Southern's monopoly con-
at various points, and generate benefits only for the applicants (125). 
Several aspects of the ICC decision should be noted. First, the ICC did 
back down from its policy established in Ex Parte 438. Based upon its 
policy (i.e., the elimination of the "special circumstances" doctrine) and 
operating plan filed by the applicants, the ICC concluded that the Norfolk 
would use the trucking operation to public advantage in its overall 
•mutmrtation activities [emphasis added] (126). Second, as in the CSX-ACBL 
case, the ICC relied heavily upon the 1984 DO.J merger guidelines 
analysis of the possible anticompetitive effects (127). Third, in contrast 
CSX-ACBL case, seven commissioners were involved in the decision, 
_ several that are not viewed as strong "deregulationist ". Finally, 
formal oversight procedures were established as they were in the CSX-ACBL 
suggesting less ICC concern with the anticompetitive effects of the 
THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF DO] MERGER GUIDELINES 
The recent ICC case decisions and statements of policy for both intra-
and intermodal mergers among surface freight carriers reveal an increase 
(121) Interstate Commerce Commission, Decision, Norfolk Southern Corporation -
- North American Van Lines, Inc., (Served May 13, 1985). 
(122) Ibid, Appendix A. 
(123) Ibid, p. 15. 
(124) Ibid, p. 9. 
(125) Ibid, pp. 10-11. 
(126) Ibid, p. 21. 
(127) Ibid, pp. 24 and 26. 
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in the role and influence of the DOJ merger guidelines. Though ICC-approved 
mergers remain exempt from the federal antitrust laws, the ICC has begun rely-
ing more heavily upon the approach and philosophy of the DOJ in its regulation 
of mergers. The ICC employed the analytical tools and guidelines of the DOJ 
in recent railroad mergers and in the CSX-ACBL rail-barge case. Additionally, 
the DOJ routinely investigates such proposed mergers, and its analysis of the 
potential anticompetitive effects is formally submitted to the ICC for considera-
tion. The ICC by law must weigh the potential anticompetitive and other 
adverse effects against the potential benefits of a merger in determining whether 
the merger is consistent with the public interest. 
The ICC's class exemption for all trucking mergers poses some interest-
ing scenarios regarding the role of the DO J. As the ICC has decided to exempt 
all proposed mergers which generate no opposition on anticompetitive grounds, 
and has indicated that protesting carriers cannot oppose a merger merely 
because it injures their financial and operating performance (128), it appears 
that the only "legitimate" opposition will be that provided by the DOJ or 
other impartial parties (e.g., the U.S. Department of Transportation). Thus, 
the extent of the DOJ's role is largely dependent upon the DOJ- how involv-
ed does the DOJ want to be? There is also a chance that ICC-exempted 
trucking mergers may not be viewed as ICC-approved trucking mergers with 
respect to the exemption from antitrust law (129). If this holds true, trucking 
mergers would be viewed the same as mergers in nonregulated industries and 
subjected to DO J review. 
Given the importance of the DOJ in mergers among surface freight 
transportation companies, the following section provides a review of the DOJ's 
merger guidelines. Once the guidelines have been discussed, the authors 
present their views of the likely impacts of these guidelines upon intramodal 
and intermodal mergers. 
A. REviEw oF DO] MERGER GuiDELINES 
On three occasions the DOJ has issued merger guidelines to announce 
its enforcement policy concerning acquisitions and mergers subject to Section 
7 of the Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The guidelines are 
(128) In Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 57) on page 7 the ICC refers to "meridess" 
complaints without elaborating on what constitutes such a complaint. However, in Ex Parte 
No. 55 (Sub-No. 38F) decided four years earlier in 1980 but never officially implemented, 
the ICC indicated that " a significant responsibility will be placed on protestants to show 
how the transaction may result in the alleged anticompetitive consequences". Protestants 
would be expected to show that their ability to continue adequately serving affected markets 
would be "materially impaired". 
(129) Ibid, p. 2. 
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designed primarily to indicate when the DOJ will challenge a merger (130). 
Although the guidelines may differ substantially from established case law, 
they affect behavior of merger parties because the high costs of mounting a 
defense against antitrust prosecution will usually discourage parties from merg-
ing if the merger does not fall within the guidelines of the DO J ( 131). 
The first set of guidelines reflecting the DOJ's enforcement policies of 
the 1960's was issued in 1968 with the intent to update them periodically 
to reflect changes in law and in DOJ's enforcement policy. Despite significant 
changes in the case law and DOJ enforcement policy in the 1970's new 
guidelines were not issued until 1982 (132). It has been argued that the 
Reagan Administration, using the merger policy outlined in the 1982 guide-
lines, will not seek to block any of the large mergers currently pending (133). 
The 1982 guidelines differed from the 1968 guidelines in terms of both policy on 
.enforcement and concepts and measures used to analyze a merger. In contrast to 
the 1968 guiddines, 1982 guidelines are generally hospitable to mergers. The 
1982 guidelines are based upon the assumption that most mergers are efficiency-
.producing and most government intervention is inefficient. The new guidelines 
consider only the extent to which the particular merger creates or enhances 
market power, which is defined as the ability to price profitably above costs 
for a significant period of time. The 1968 guidelines focused on preserving 
and promoting market structures conducive to competition. Examples of 
differences between the two sets of guidelines are: (1) the 1982 guidelines 
used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure of concentration 
while the 1968 guidelines employed the four-firm concentration ratio; (2) the 
1982 guidelines recognized foreign competition, the 1968 guidelines did not; 
(3) unlike the 1968 guidelines, the 1982 guidelines cointained non-market share 
factors (e.g., ease of entry) that may indicate that no challenge should be 
made despite a finding based upon the concentration criteria that would nor-
mally trigger a challenge; and (4) under the 1982 guidelines, vertical mergers 
were usually viewed as efficiency-producing while under the 1968 guidelines they 
were perceived to be almost always unnecessary to realize efficiencies. The 
DO}'s establishment and use of these new concepts and measures were pro-
merger (1.34). 
In June of 1984, the OOJ issued its third set of merger guidelines. 
· These new guidelines, although modifying the language of the 1982 guidelines, 
(130) U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines, June 14, 1984, p. 2. 
(131) Peter Bronsteen, "A Review of the Revised Merger Guidelines", The Anti-
trust Bulletin, Winter 1984, p. 614. 
(132) U.S. Department of Justice, p. 1. 
(133) Robert E. Taylor and Andy Pasztor, "Antitrust Officials Unlikely to Challenge 
Pending Mergers During Reagan's Term", Wall Street Journal, Vol. LXV, June 28, 1985, 
p. 2. 
(134) See Eleanor M. Fox, "The New Merger Guidelines - a blueprint for micro-
. economic analysis", The Antitrust Bulletin, Fall 1982, pp. 552-563 for a discussion of these 
' differences. 
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do not represent a different enforcement policy (135). It has been argued that 
the 1984 guidelines simply clarify certain concepts in the 1982 guidelines and 
explain how the DOJ has applied the 1982 guidelines (136). Although numer-
ous minor changes were made to the 1982 guidelines, three changes are 
particularly important. First, the discussion of market concentration ratios, 
the HHI thresholds, was modified to clarify that the DOJ will not challenge 
mergers solely on the basis of HHI criteria. Second, the 1984 guidelines spelled 
out more thoroughly how foreign competition would be accounted for in 
defining the market and measuring market concentration. Third, the 1984 
guidelines modified the language in the 1982 guidelines to clearly indicate that 
the DOJ does not ignore efficiency claims and to identify the types of efficiencies 
that will normally be considered (economies of scale, better integration of 
production facilities, plant specialization, and lower transportation costs) (137). 
The review of the three sets of guidelines indicate that the DO J cur-
rently has a much more pro-merger enforcement policy than it did in 1968. 
In addition, the DOJ has subordinated court-made legal antitrust rules to 
economic analysis, which has been argued to have been used by the DO J to 
avoid intervening in mergers (138). The pro-merger stance of the ICC in 
recent intra- and intermodal merger cases and the ICC's reliance on economic 
analysis in merger cases and less reliance on legal precedent are consistent 
with the position of the primary U.S. merger antitrust enforcement agency -
the DOJ. It is difficult to separate the pro-merger influences of the recent 
deregulation policies specific to the transportation sector from the pro-merger 
policies of the DOJ that apply to all other sectors of the economy. 
B. APPLICABILITY AND IMPACT OF DO] MERGER GuiDELINES 
As noted above, the ICC has employed to some degree the current DOJ 
merger guidelines in several recent mergers. The steps under the DOJ merger 
guidelines for ascertaining whether a merger will increase market power, the 
new focus on merger policy, are the following: (1) define the relevant market; 
(2) measure the concentration before and after the proposed merger; and, (3) 
for those acquisitions that do not fall safely within the harbors established by 
the guidelines, examine other factors to help interpret the market concentra-
tion findings (139). Under the merger guidelines, the relevant market has two 
dimensions: product and geographic (140). In the context of transportation 
(135) William French Smith, U.S. Attorney General, press release, mimeo, June 14, 
pp. 2-3. . ! ! ,::§Ill 
(136) P. Bronsteen, op. cit., p. 650. 
(137) U.S. Department of Justice, Statement Accompanying Release of Revised 
Merger Guidelines, June 14, 1984, pp. 8-17. 
(138) RE. Taylor and A. Pasztor, op. cit., p. 2. 
(139) P. Bronsteen, op. cit., pp. 61~25. 
(140) Ibid, pp. 61~20. 
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, the product dimension requires decisions with respect to inclusion of 
carriage, other modes, and whether the transportation of different major 
xnmodity groups constitute separate markets. For transportation mergers, 
questions concerning the geographic dimension of markets include what is 
appropriate size of area (e.g., region, nation) and if (and which) individual 
(e.g., river segments, city-pairs) should be considered. Both demand 
ubstitution and supply substitution are considered by the DOJ in identifying 
relevant market (141). 
The DOJ merger guidelines employ the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
to measure market concentration. The HHI is calculated by summing 
squares of the individual market shares of all the firms included in 
relevant market and is thus sensitive to both the relative size and number 
·firms in the market (142). The merger guidelines note that a horizontal 
with a postmerger HHI of less than a 1000 will not be challenged 
in extraordinary circumstances. In cases where the postmerger HHI is 
1000 and 1800, the DOJ is unlikely to challenge mergers that increase 
HHI by less than 100, and is likely to challenge mergers that increase 
by more than 100. In acquisitions where the postmerger HHI is 
1800, and thus considered to be highly concentrated, the DOJ will be 
to challenge if the merger increased the HHI by less than 50 points, 
to challenge if the HHI is increased by more than 50 but less than 100, 
will challenge except in extraordinary circumstances if the HHI is in-
by more than 100 (143). 
For those mergers that are likely to be challenged based upon the post-
HHI, the analysis of other factors will take place. The "other factors " 
relevant to transportation mergers are ease of entry (likelihood and 
p:obable magnitude of entry which would occur within two years in response 
a small but significant increase in price), and factors that relate to the ease 
profitability of collusion (e.g., product homogeneity, capacity of fringe 
, current market conduct and performance by firms in the industry and eco-
efficiencies (144). 
The current DO J merger guidelines identify only three cases in which 
DO] may challenge a vertical merger (e.g., an "end-to-end" railroad mer-
(145). First, vertical mergers that create objectionable barriers to entry 
be challenged. Before this " barrier to entry " condition will trigger a 
~enge, however, three necessary (but not sufficient) conditions must be met: 
merger must force entrants to enter at both levels (e.g., all new entrants 
have to enter as an integrated rail-barge firm); (2) this required simulta-
(141) Ibid, p. 616. 
(142) Ibid, p. 620. 
(143) Ibid, pp. 620-626. 
(144) Ibid, pp. 624-626. 
(145) See E.M. Fox, op. cit., pp. 543-547 for a more detailed discussion of the appli-
of the merger guidelines with respect to vertical mergers. 
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neous entry to both markets (e.g., rail and barge markets) is substantially more 
difficult than entry into a single market; and (3) the concentration in the market 
in which the competitive concerns are being considered are relatively high 
(above 1800 HHI). The DOJ may also challenge vertical mergers which facil-
itate collusion in the upstream market (e.g., the rail market in a normal rail-
barge movement) by vertically integrating into the retail markets and/or elimi-
nate a particularly disruptive buyer in a downstream market. The DOJ is 
unlikely to challenge a vertical merger on this " collusion " ground in the first 
case unless a HHI of 1800 is found in the upstream market, and a large per-
centage of the upstream product would be sold through vertically-integrated 
outlets after the merger. In the second case (i.e., elimination of the disruptive 
buyer), the DOJ is unlikely to challenge unless a HHI of 1800 is found in 
the upstream market and the eliminated disruptive firm differed substantially 
from the other firms in the market. In addition, the DOJ will consider challeng-
ing vertical mergers that create substantial opportunities for evasion of rate 
regulation (e.g., railroad rate regulation by the ICC). 
A review of the above DOJ merger guidelines and the ICC application 
of them in recent merger cases strongly suggests that, in the absence of ICC 
merger regulation, no rail-barge, rail-truck, or trucking mergers would be chal-
lenged by the DOJ. With respect to horizontal mergers, the use of a narrowly 
defined relevant market may produce HHI findings that would trigger a DOJ 
challenge. This use of a narrowly defined relevant market, however would 
probably insure a finding that easy entry (from firms serving other routes or car-
rying other commodities) would prevent the merged firm from gaining any market 
power and thus the merger would not be challenged. The use of regional or na-
tional markets as the relevant market, on the other hand, though reducing the 
value of the ease-of-entry argument, would not produce HHI numbers that exceed 
DO] thresholds {146). Thus, primarily because of the ease of entry character-
istic of the barge and trucking industries, rail-barge, rail-truck and trucking 
horizontal mergers would very likely not be challenged by the DOJ. Because 
the cases in which the DOJ would challenge a vertical merger have been 
observed to be relatively rare, it is unlikely that any proposed rail-barge, rail-
truck or trucking mergers would be challenged under the vertical merger 
guidelines (147). 
Conversely the parallel or horizontal aspects of many railroad mergers, in 
the absence of ICC merger regulation, would likely encounter opposition from 
the DOJ. A narrow definition of relevant markets would almost certainly place 
many rail markets in the highly concentrated market classification as measured 
by the DOJ's HHI criteria. Unlike mergers involving trucking firms and 
barge lines, intramodal rail mergers would find no escape from DOJ opposition 
through the ease-of-entry argument. 
(146) See D. Breen, op. cit., pp. 8-9 for a discussion of how proposed trucking 
mergers would fare under the current OOJ merger guidelines. 
(147) E.M. Fox, op. cit., p. 544. 
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Similarly, though more difficult to measure, the DO J would likely scruti-
the end-to-end or vertical aspects of proposed rail mergers closely. Many 
markets have a HHI value above 1800 and would, thus, attract DOJ 
The DOJ's position in the Union Pacific-Missouri Pacific-Western Pacific 
a mostly end-to-end merger approved by the ICC in 1982, supports 
contentions. First, the DOJ adopted a narrow definition of the rele-
. . . market in this case. The product market was confined to rail transporta-
. tion as intermodal competition was judged not to be effective. The relevant 
··geographic markets were origin and destination county pairs (148). As a 
result, the DOJ found competitive harm likely to occur in those markets where 
the merger applicants operated parallel routes. Second, though the DOJ did 
• · not perform traffic diversion studies to assess the likely competitive harm 
resulting from the end-to-end aspects of the merger, the DOJ did express its 
views on the potential anticompetitive effects of such integration and urged 
the ICC to proceed cautiously in analyzing foreclosuse arguments (149). The 
ICC summarized the DOJ's concerns in its decision on this merger: 
"DOJ notes that while end-to-end mergers involve railroads which 
do not compete between the same origins and destinations, such mer-
gers can still produce competitive harms. First, source competition 
at common points can be adversely affected. Second, such a merger 
can act to reduce competition between the merged firm and other 
railroads. OOJ states that this can occur because a railroad which 
is the sole carrier on one portion of a movement might have the 
ability to eliminate competition between its merger partner and 
other potential interline carriers for the other part of the haul. DOJ 
states that, in addition to the direct anticompetitive impact, such 
market power diversions may lead to reduced ability on the part of 
carriers suffering such diversions to competitively discipline the rates 
and service levels offered by the consolidated system (150) ". 
In conclusion, the authors believe that the ICC's greater reliance upon 
DOJ merger guidelines will not affect the ICC's general permissive attitude 
UJWard surface freight transportation mergers. As noted, trucking and intermo-
mergers would not likely be challenged under these guidelines. Though 
rail mergers would likely produce significant anticompetitive effects in 
markets, the ICC's imposition of protective traffic conditions to alleviate 
effects will probably continue in order to permit the attainment of 
benefits. The forthcoming decision in the proposed Southern Paci£c-
Fe merger, a primarily parallel merger, will provide a strong test for 
postulation. 
(148) Finance Docket No. 30000, pp. 674-676. 
(149) Ibid, p. 677. 
(150) Ibid, p. 676. 
